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Simon Rawidowicz, “Hashpaitis”, and the Perils of Influence

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I

On February 20, 1949, the American Yiddish journal, *Di Tsukunft*, organized a symposium at its annual dinner in New York devoted to “the state of Israel and the Jews of other countries.”¹ The mounting of the symposium less than a year after the State of Israel was formally proclaimed came in the midst of an intense period of debate among Jewish individuals and groups in the United States, including those who were not usually identified as Zionist but now felt compelled to rethink their opposition.² Both the tragedy of the Shoah and the birth of a Jewish state bespoke a new reality that called into question long-held beliefs.

Against this backdrop, the socialist-leaning *Tsukunft* saw fit to initiate a discussion that had at its center the relationship between the new State and the Jewish communities beyond its borders. Was this the moment at which the long-held Zionist goal of “negating the Exile” would be realized? Would Hebrew now declare its decisive victory over Yiddish in the long-running *Sprachenkampf* between the two languages? Indeed, had the owl of Minerva arrived at the gate of Diaspora Jewish culture in general?

The opening speaker at the symposium was Israel’s first ambassador to the United States, Eliyahu Eilat (né Epstein). Eilat struck an ecumenical note at the outset—and in a Yiddish noticeably inflected by modern Hebrew—by lauding the work of *Di Tsukunft* “in the development of Yiddish cultural life in America.”³ Eilat then re-assumed his official role as an Israeli representative by affirming that “the State of Israel has at long last brought to an end Jewish homelessness.” He continued by arguing that “in order for there to be a Jewish state, the Tower of Babel must be liquidated.” That is, a single national language, Hebrew, must be recognized.⁴

Without a doubt, the State of Israel was, for Eilat, the engine now driving Jewish life. It had the responsibility to “awaken and strengthen in Jews everywhere the stubborn will of old to live as Jews... to build the maximum

possible Jewish existence in the Diaspora (*Yidishkayt in Golus*), and at the same time, to begin laying the bricks for the edifice of redemption.”⁵ Eilath conceded to those assembled that the State of Israel was not the sole actor in that drama. “Jews in America”, he argued toward the end of his speech, “must be prepared to take upon themselves to be an influence” in their own right.⁶

There was in Eilath’s words a curious mix of sensibilities. On one hand, he remained unshakably convinced of the historic import and virtue of the Zionist way. On the other, he effected a rather conciliatory posture toward his audience, and Diaspora Jewry in general—and at a moment when others of his official station and ideological persuasion gave themselves over to an entirely triumphalist tenor. But it is not Eilath’s diplomatic grace that intrigues us for the moment. Rather, it is his assertion that Diaspora Jewry could still exert an influence, presumably on the State of Israel, in Jewish affairs.

On the face of it, there is nothing remarkable in Eilath’s use of the term. It is hard to imagine a world, after all, in which influence is absent. And yet, the term sets the stage, literally and figuratively, for the speaker who followed Eilath at the *Tsukunft* forum, Simon Rawidowicz (1896-1957). In the course of his remarks, Rawidowicz challenged the validity of the very idea of influence and even diagnosed a condition he called “hashpaitis”, from the Hebrew word for “influence”, to describe those who were beholden to the view that the Land of Israel does or should influence the Diaspora in a unidirectional fashion.⁷ In the first part of this essay, I would like to explore the context and meaning of Rawidowicz’s diagnosis of “hashpaitis” before moving on in the second part to discuss recent challenges to an influence-based model of explanation in the field of Jewish studies. It is my hope that this sequence can yield insight into the process of cultural interaction, negotiation, and exchange that stands at the center of this issue of *transversal*.

II

At the time of the *Tsukunft* forum, Rawidowicz was teaching at the College of Jewish Studies in Chicago, the latest stop in a peripatetic scholarly career that brought him from Lithuania to Germany, England, and finally the United States. Soon after the forum, he would realize a life dream by earning a professorial appointment to the newly created Brandeis University. Brandeis represented the kind of Jewish institution to which Rawidowicz had long aspired, a modern-day version of the great academies of Sura and Pumbedita that once made Babylonia the rival, and even envy, of the Land of Israel.⁸

This desire helps illuminate Rawidowicz's distinctive vision of Jewish nationalism. For purposes of clarity, it might be helpful to situate that vision on a spectrum of Jewish nationalist thinking between the poles of Simon Dubnow and Ahad Ha-am, two of Rawidowicz's key sources of inspiration and criticism at once. Thus, he shared Dubnow's steadfast devotion to the Diaspora as a living center of Jewish life. But unlike Dubnow and other diasporists, he accepted neither the supremacy of Yiddish over Hebrew nor the logic of a major center of Jewish life in the Diaspora *at the expense* of one in Palestine.

With respect to the other titan of early twentieth-century Jewish cultural nationalism, Rawidowicz shared Ahad Ha-am's unyielding commitment to Hebrew language and culture as the connective tissue among Jews worldwide. And yet, he sharply criticized Ahad Ha-am's notion that the relationship between the Land of Israel and the Diaspora was like that of a center to its periphery. Over the course of some three decades, Rawidowicz insisted that the relationship between the Land of Israel and the Diaspora be understood as an "ellipse", according to which the sum of the distance from any point on it to two foci is constant.⁹ In this view, the Jewish people, which Rawidowicz preferred to call by the traditional term "Yisrael", had two co-equal centers of culture and national life. He gave clearest expression to this distinctive notion in the capstone work of his career, on which he was working at the time of his death in 1957. The title of this two volume study was *Bavel vi-Yerushalayim*—Babylon and Jerusalem—connoting the symbolic centers of Jewish national life throughout the ages.

A fair portion of the two volumes dealt with the relationship between Babylon and Jerusalem, or the Diaspora and the land of Israel, *after 1948*. The creation of the State of Israel, following the Holocaust, seemed to mark an unmistakable realignment of the balance of power between the two centers. Now possessed of international recognition and sovereignty, the Jewish community in historic Palestine was on the verge of realizing the Zionist dream of returning to the ancestral homeland as victors. Simon Rawidowicz noticed in the joyous moment of triumph that swept the Jewish world after the creation of the State a powerful and somewhat dangerous streak. As he declared at the *Tsukunft* symposium:

⁹(T)he shofar of the Messiah thunders almost every day and night. It is certainly not so easy for us to stand with one foot in the messianic era and the other in a world without the Messiah. Great and beautiful are the present messianic days of 1948–49, but they are also difficult, indeed very difficult. It seems as if the Messiah has arrived, he is here—and he is not here, not

yet. Whoever does not sense the great difficulty, the great severity of the historical twilight—these days in which the Messiah has come and yet not come—does not feel the pulse of our time.¹⁰

Rawidowicz here recalls Ahad Ha-am's famous note of dissent at the First Zionist Congress in Basel in 1897 when he likened himself to a mourner at a wedding feast. Fifty years after Basel, Rawidowicz felt alienated from the intoxicated glee of others Jews over the restoration of Jewish political power. The creation of the State of Israel had not ushered in a messianic age. "We will probably live for a longer time in this historical twilight", he noted, adding in a particularly lachrymose vein that "a Third World War may extend this twilight much longer than we now think."¹¹

Rawidowicz's sense of foreboding—clearly reflecting the emerging Cold War—did not mean that he opposed the creation of the State in the first place. He referred to Israel as "that state that we all want to, and must, strengthen and expand." He further observed that "the entire world sings the praises of the Land of Israel, and we must certainly do so as well." But he continued, "we do not discharge our obligation merely by singing praise."¹²

In the first instance, Rawidowicz evoked the spirit of thinkers from Marx to Hermann Cohen in yearning for the day when "the true Messiah will come and the world will be freed of the exclusivistic, egotistical sovereignty of states large and small that results in bloody wars and destruction." But recognizing that this day had not yet come—in fact, that a certain false messianism prevailed in his time—he nonetheless insisted that the State of Israel should not have "one ounce less sovereignty than all other states", at least in its external relations with other states.¹³

That final point reminds us of another instance in which Rawidowicz refused to join the chorus of Jewish praise over the establishment of the State of Israel. While the State must be sovereign, like other countries, in the international political arena, it *could not* be sovereign within the Jewish world. For in Rawidowicz's view, "the State of Israel and the Jewish Diaspora *together* create the concept and the reality of the 'people of Israel.' Internally, between Jew and Jew, it must be more a matter of identity and absolute solidarity and less of sovereignty and isolationism."¹⁴

Rawidowicz preferred to dwell less on sovereignty than on *shutafut*, the Hebrew term he frequently invoked to signify the genuine and deep partnership that must obtain between Babylon and Jerusalem. Between the two co-equal parts of the Jewish nation, there could be no binds, ties, or even loyalties. These terms conveyed a sense of distance between two discrete parts. For example, "loyalty", he wrote, "is a relationship between two sepa-

rate entities A and B." A Jew cannot be loyal to another Jew, because he is "identical to him." The proof text for this claim—what Rawidowicz called the "basic law engraved in our body and soul"—was the traditional Talmudic refrain that "All Israel are responsible for each other."¹⁵

In fact, Rawidowicz was conjuring up an entity of greater historical depth and durability than a state, an extraterritorial nation. Like a state, the Jewish nation deserved its own "constitution" and "basic laws", though he hastened to add that precious few clauses were needed. The essence could be reduced to the phrase *Yisrael ehad*, "Israel is One", with the second word to be pronounced with the same emphasis as it is in the core Jewish prayer, the *Shema Yisrael*.¹⁶

The liturgical reference made by Rawidowicz lent a measure of gravity, even sanctity, to his vision of a unified Jewish nation.¹⁷ The indivisibility of Israel was the paramount value in his distinctive nationalist scheme. To the extent that Zionism could revive a portion of that unified nation, it was to be praised. But to the extent that the creation of the State advanced the often-quoted Zionist goal of "negating the Diaspora", of eradicating one of the two centers of Jewish national life, it was to be criticized. Similarly, if the State now sought to exert a dominant "influence" on Diaspora life, then it failed to grasp its true historical mission.

III

At long last, we arrive at the matter of "influence." In Simon Rawidowicz's lexicon, "influence" was a term of opprobrium, indicating the hegemonic aspirations and cultural imposition of one actor upon another. It was also in his view a symptomatic feature of Zionist thought, commencing with Ahad Ha-am, who imagined the Jewish center in Palestine to be the source of creativity and vitality and the Jewish population in the Diaspora to be its passive beneficiary.

This claim took on new life, Rawidowicz observed, in the days of messianic triumphalism surrounding the creation of the State of Israel. The State, many believed, was the ascendant, and soon-to-be dominant, force in Jewish national life. From this point forward, it would sustain the Diaspora—unless or until the Diaspora ceased to exist.

Rawidowicz diagnosed this kind of thinking as "hashpaitis", a malady that assumed the constancy of one actor's influence upon another. He hastened to add that the question was not whether or how the State of Israel would influence the Diaspora, but rather whether the Diaspora would manifest its own "initiative" and "creativity."¹⁸ He noted that self-reliance was essential

not only in 1949, “when 94 percent of all Jew live in the Diaspora”, but also at later stages when only 40 or 50 % of the world’s Jews would live outside of Israel.¹⁹

What is most striking in Rawidowicz’s brief against “influence” is the insistence on Diaspora independence. This point, which he had long advocated on a mix of historical, cultural, and demographic grounds, had now come under attack owing to the rise of a Jewish political state. Consequently, he felt compelled to defend it at the *Tsukunft* forum and elsewhere. The issue at hand for Rawidowicz was not simply the physical survival of Jews outside of Israel, but also the self-sufficiency and ongoing creativity of a Jewish Diaspora.

There is something at once incisive and yet antiquated about Rawidowicz’s defense of the Diaspora. On one hand, he was clear-headed in recognizing that Jewish communal life in the Diaspora would not wither away overnight, or even over the course of several generations. On the other, his hopes for a self-reliant Jewish Diaspora that was *possessed of its own well-defined cultural agenda* were rooted in an era of Jewish nationalist discourse that had since passed. The creation of the State of Israel signaled not only the institutional enshrinement of Zionism, but the end of the active contest among competing camps of Jewish nationalist ideologues that was waged with particular intensity in the early twentieth century.

This mix of realism and anachronism might help explain an unresolved tension in Rawidowicz’s address at the *Tsukunft* forum. As we have seen, he was adamant in supporting the independence of the Diaspora as a cultural center in its own right. In one of his sharpest formulations, he insisted that the Diaspora not be regarded “simply as a reservoir of money and of people ... as the liquidated stock of a bankrupt company, or as communities that persist as a commemoration of the Holocaust.” Rather, the Diaspora “needs a kind of auto-emancipation as a counter to those who either say *kaddish* for it or who lull it to sleep.”²⁰ It must exist on its own strength in order to serve its own constituency.

At the same time, he was adamant that Israel and the Diaspora exist in a state of seamless interdependence. He emphasized throughout his remarks that the two major centers could not relate to one another as separate entities. “Statehood and statelessness”, he insisted, “are two attributes of one and the same substance called ‘Israel.’” Indeed, so seamless were the two that Rawidowicz was reminded of Spinoza’s famous equation of God and Nature (*Deus sive Natura*).²¹

But can an entity be both fully independent and seamlessly interdependent with another entity? Rawidowicz failed to address the tension between these two visions of the relationship between Israel and the Diaspora. It is not our purpose to reconcile them here, except to note again the curious mix of qualities in what we might call his political theory. While clinging, somewhat anachronistically, to the notion of a coherent Diasporist cultural agenda found decades earlier in theorists such as Dubnow, Zhitlovsky, or Medem, Rawidowicz proved to be as keenly attuned to the presence of two major centers of Jewish life as any contemporary observer. The result was a perspective marked both by a certain naïveté and a genuine prescience.

It is that latter quality that compels us to reconsider Rawidowicz's views about influence here. In diagnosing "hashpaitis", he was concerned with a global, but wholly internal Jewish world. Between the two main centers that constituted this world, the State of Israel and the Diaspora, there could be no currents of influence. The two were one, and thus incapable of exerting an influence upon each other.

IV

Rawidowicz's reservations about "hashpaitis" adumbrate and call to mind a recent trend in Jewish studies to move beyond an influence-based model of historical explication. On the face of it, this move seems fruitless and foolhardy. After all, how can one study the past without tracing the influence of one particular event or actor on another? Is there a way to understand change or development in history without the variable instances and effects of influence?

The problem is interestingly compounded in the case of Jewish history, where scholars, especially in the early to mid-twentieth century, were intent on demonstrating that the Jewish people somehow resisted the gravitational pull of influence. Operating under a variety of nationalist ideologies, these scholars argued that the Jewish people was guided by an immanent force that allowed it either to repel or rise above external forces.

But even in this case, influence was a criterion to be considered and evaluated before being deferred. In fact, most Jewish studies scholars, from the birth of *Wissenschaft des Judentums* until recent times, have seen fit to measure the balance of internal and external forces in narrating Jewish history. It is in this regard that Rawidowicz's *Tsukunft* lecture signals a prescient shift. For in seeking to avoid "hashpaitis", he was attempting to understand an historical organism (i.e., the dual-centered Jewish nation) not as a pair of discrete parts influencing one another, but rather as "a single circulatory sys-

tem." I draw this phrase not from Rawidowicz, but from Daniel Boyarin as he described the religious and social world of rabbinic Judaism and Christianity in the centuries 70 C.E.²² Unlike Boyarin, Rawidowicz was decidedly uninterested in the nature of relations between Jews and non-Jews. But quite similar to (and in advance of) Boyarin, he was intent on arriving at a model of explanation that resisted the impulse to assign influence to one actor or another.

It is interesting that Rawidowicz's resistance to influence finds a parallel in the discussion of the relations between Judaism and Christianity in antiquity. But it should not surprise us altogether. In the post-Vatican II era, scholars, Jewish and Christian alike, have tended to discard the long-regnant vision of Christian supercessionism, as well as the claim of unending polemic and hostility between the two religious traditions.²³ Increasingly, they have focused on the common origins and shared ritual practices of the two—up to the point of asserting the existence of a "single circulatory system." In doing so, they have tended, like Galit Hasan-Rokem, "to look at interaction between cultures in terms of dialogue rather than 'influence' (often defined ... according to a unidirectional conceptualization)."²⁴

A similar trend animates scholarship dealing with ancient Judaism's other chief foil, Hellenism. Rather than assess the extent to which Jews either resisted or fell prey to the allures of a hedonistic Greek paganism, scholars such as John Barclay, Shaye Cohen, Erich Gruen, Martha Himmelfarb, and Lee Levine have focused on the shared properties of and bi-directional exchange between Judaism and Hellenism. For them, the etiological quest—determining who influenced whom first—has yielded to a nuanced mapping of cultural systems with extremely porous borders. This approach is aptly described by Peter Schäfer, another scholar who has worked extensively on the interplay between ancient Greek and Jewish cultures. The task at hand, Schäfer argues, is to chart "a dynamic relationship in which the influenced actively and creatively 'digests' what it receives, creating something that is new, no longer identical with its 'origin.'"²⁵

It is curious that this impulse to overcome the rigid boundaries between two cultural systems has been applied to two sets of long-held oppositions *in antiquity* (i. e., Judaism and Christianity and Judaism and Hellenism). It is even more curious that this impulse appears in scholarship on the Middle Ages, given the lachrymose framing that has often been given to medieval Jewish-Christian relations. And yet, one prominent scholar has recently called on colleagues "to take note no less of that which is common to Jewish

and Christian culture in the Middle Ages than of overtures that members of these cultures make to foreign values outside of their own."²⁶

In one of the most interesting critiques of the influence-based model of explanation, Moshe Rosman makes the case in explicit terms. He observes that Jewish ritual practices, sumptuary and culinary norms, gender patterns, economic practices, folk legends, and political theory in early modern times find striking parallels in contemporaneous Polish Christian society. But rather than rush to judge them as signs of "influence", Rosman asks whether "they might be better characterized as cultural accretions by default."²⁷ His assumption is that Jews and Christians in Poland inhabited a shared cultural "polysystem" in which vectors of cultural influence moved in many directions and created a shared repository from which Jews and Christians alike drew.

Much more intuitive is the application of this mode of thought to the modern Jewish experience, when fluid movement across territorial and cultural boundaries has been the norm rather than the exception. The imperative to integrate into the host society, balanced by the desire to preserve a measure of group identity, has created a rich stock of hyphenated identities out of which it is often difficult to segregate completely discrete components (e.g., Jewish vs. American). Not surprisingly, scholars of German Jews such as Steven Aschheim, Peter Gordon, Klaus Hödl, Samuel Moyn, Anson Rabinbach, and Till van Rahden have found them to be an especially suitable group for consideration in this vein. Even if not consciously eschewing the notion of "influence", they regard the interplay between Jews and non-Jews in German society—up to the rise of Hitler—as an ongoing and active exchange of cultural values. This is not to say that the cultural traffic between Jews and Christians in German society was always smooth. As we know well, it was often quite turbulent. Nevertheless, one is reminded when thinking of that traffic of Eduard Gans' desire, expressed in 1822, that German Jews "live on as a river lives on in an ocean."²⁸

To live on as a river in an ocean is a rather difficult notion to conjure up. It suggests a mystifyingly simultaneous loss and retention of cultural distinctiveness. And yet, for all its inscrutability, this formulation captures something of the fluidity and evanescence of modern Jewish identities, at times clearly defined and at other times flickering. Gans' own life was an interesting variation on the theme of the river in the ocean. After serving as president of the Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden in the early 1820s, the young scholar of Roman law converted from Judaism to Christianity in 1825 in order to gain a university appointment. This act did not

dislodge Gans from the annals of Jewish history; he is remembered, after all, as a founding father of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*. More to the point, his life seemed to personify the very image of a river in an ocean, alternately retaining and losing its form in response to an ever shifting balance of cultural vectors.

Interestingly, we might be able to make a similar statement about Gans' more Jewishly identified colleague from the Verein, Leopold Zunz. Unlike Gans, Zunz operated almost exclusively in a Jewish institutional world. But like Gans, he himself contemplated conversion as a young man and believed that Jews would become truly emancipated only when the discipline of Jewish studies was integrated into the German university system.

The juxtaposition between the two is not intended to answer the question of who had a more intensive Jewish upbringing or who was more assimilated. Rather, it prompts us to inquire whether it is fair to say that Gans, by dint of conversion, fell more prey to the *influence* of German culture and society than Zunz. Would that determination tell us much about the complex, dynamic, and idiosyncratic process of cultural formation in either of them? For that matter, would it make any more understandable the notion of German culture or society?

At the risk of vast oversimplification, we must reiterate that we are on shaky ground if we altogether avoid the ascription of influence in our historical explanations. To take but one example, we would be hard-pressed to understand Gans without recourse to his mentor, Hegel, or Zunz without recourse to the Berlin philologists, Wolff and Boeckh. And yet, while we can't live without it, we must acknowledge that the ascription of "influence" can be a coarse tool that registers only a fraction of the cultural activity present in a given milieu or that traces cultural movement in only one direction. In this sense, the act of determining "influence" can be a truncated path that bypasses a rugged terrain filled with many rich culture veins, often in the name of narrative seamlessness.

The critique of influence clearly owes something to the advent of post-colonial studies, most particularly, the claim that that the colonized did not merely surrender to the "influence" of the colonizer, but often refashioned the latter's language and culture into a new idiom. And yet, there is also a deeply historicist quality to it. For in avoiding the single and truncated path of "influence", we are attuned to a wider array of historical factors and

directions, and thus come closer to realizing the ambition of grasping the explosive compound of forces that constitutes an historical moment.

A related insight emerges from a recurrence of the river metaphor in a later German-Jewish figure, Franz Rosenzweig. Rosenzweig's collected writings from 1926 bore the title *Zweistromland*. The image of a land of two rivers—and the assumption of a resulting fertile plain—hark back to the vibrant Babylonian culture that arose between the Tigris and Euphrates. At the same time, Rosenzweig's title gestures to an analogous cultural plain formed by the rivers of German and Jewish culture. For an inhabitant of this plain like Rosenzweig, or for his mentor and friend Hermann Cohen, it was difficult to establish where the Jewish current began and the German current ended. Even when each decided to dedicate himself anew to the revival of Jewish thought, they did so very much as German Jews.

Moreover, each of these figures was the legatee of an intellectual and cultural tradition shared—more than imparted—by Christian contemporaries. Indeed, German Jews and Christians were the joint heirs of an Enlightenment legacy reshaped by the meandering course of nationalism in the nineteenth century. Cohen, for his part, was part of a cohort of young German thinkers who revived the legacy of Immanuel Kant in German philosophy. A generation later, Rosenzweig was part of a cohort of young thinkers who attempted to overcome the legacy of neo-Kantianism by harnessing philosophy to an urgent new attempt to grasp *Existenz*.

Rather than treat either Cohen or Rosenzweig as a passive receptor of influence, it makes more sense to see them as active actors in a large intellectual field, initiating as well as absorbing currents of ideas and values from their non-Jewish contemporaries. Admittedly, it is easier to trace unidirectional lines of influence than it is to chart multidirectional currents that intersect and blend with others. But the payoff for the latter is a rich and complex mapping of cultural exchange and negotiation.

To be sure, it is the rare scholar who not only advocates but implements such an approach. In my own work on anti-historicism in German and German-Jewish thought, I attempted, did not always succeed in creating this kind of a map.³⁰ But as with a good number of other scholars today, I was aware of the limitations of an influence-based model of historical explanation and sought to chart the ever-changing nature of Jewish cultural formation without over-reliance on it. Historical research today, particularly into

the Jewish past, should seize the moment and realize even fuller rewards from this cartographic approach.

V

By way of brief conclusion, I'd like to recall the seeming incongruity of this essay. On the face of it, there is relatively little connection between the subject of Simon Rawidowicz's *Tsukunft* 1949 address, "Two that are one", with which we began and the recent trend in Jewish historical scholarship discussed thereafter. But as we scratch beneath the surface, we notice the shared concern with the inadequacy of influence in explaining past and present relationships. Rawidowicz's diagnosis of "hashpaitis", while directed in its day at the contemporary relationship between Jew and Jew, can serve as a call to historical researchers today to develop more refined tools for navigating the plains of cultural history than the blunt instrument of influence. Here, as in many other areas, Rawidowicz was ahead of his time. In tribute to him, we would do well to recognize his prescient awareness that we remain beholden to "influence" only at our own peril.

Endnotes

- 1 "Medines Yisroel un di yidn fun anderer lender", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 279-294.
- 2 For a survey of debates among Zionist supporters and critics in the United States in this period, see Yosef Gorny, *The State of Israel in Jewish Public Thought: The Quest for Collective Identity* (New York, 1994).
- 3 Eilath, "Medines Yisroel un di tsukunft fun dem yidishn folk", 279.
- 4 *Ibid.*, 280, 281.
- 5 *Ibid.*, 280-281.
- 6 *Ibid.*, 282.
- 7 Rawidowicz derived this neologism from *hashpa'ah*, the Hebrew word for "influence." The rendering of the term in his *Tsukunft* remarks, written in Latin characters as "Haspoheitis", seems to be a mistaken transliteration, better rendered as "hashpaitis." Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 287.
- 8 See his comments in "Shivre devarim", *Metsudah* 5-6 (1948), 560.
- 9 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 284. I have modified somewhat the translation of this essay, "Two that are One", that appears in Rawidowicz, *State of Israel, Diaspora, and Jewish Continuity: Essays on the "Ever-Dying People"* (Hanover, NH, 1986), 151.
- 10 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 283; "Two that are One", 149.
- 11 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 284; "Two that are One", 150.
- 12 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May-June 1949), 282-283; "Two that are One", 148.

- 13 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 285; "Two that are One", 153.
- 14 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 285; "Two that are One", 152.
- 15 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz aynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 284; "Two that are One", 151.
- 16 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 285–286; "Two that are One", 154–155.
- 17 Liturgical framing evident from very outside, when he cast in the mold of Rosh Ha-Shanah musaf.
- 18 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 287; "Two that are One", 156.
- 19 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 288; "Two that are One", 158.
- 20 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 286, 288; "Two that are One", 154, 158.
- 21 Rawidowicz, "Tsvay voz zaynen ayns", *Di Tsukunft* 54 (May–June 1949), 287; "Two that are One", 157.
- 22 Daniel Boyarin, *Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism* (Stanford, 1999), 9.
- 23 Special mention should be made here of the pioneering labors of Geza Vermes in his work on Jesus' Jewish origins (1973), though since that time, a growing number of Jewish and Christian scholars have elaborated on this important revision and rethought the nature of Jewish-Christian relations after 70 C. E. (including Boyarin, Galit Hasan, Rokem, Alan Segal, Wayne Meeks, Charlotte Fonrobert, and Christine Hayes to mention only a few).
- 24 Galit Hasan-Rokem, "Narratives in Dialogue: A Folk Literary Perspective on Interreligious Contacts in the Holy Land in Rabbinic Literature of Late Antiquity", Guy Stroumsa and Arieh Kofsky, eds. *Sjaromg the Sacred" Religious Conflicts and Contacts in the Holy Land* (Jerusalem, 1998), 127; quoted in Boyarin, *Dying for God*, 10.
- 25 Peter Schäfer, *Mirror of His Beauty: Feminine Images of God from the Bible to the Early Kabbala* (Princeton, 2002), 230.
- 26 Jeremy Cohen, "'Gezerot TaTNaV'—ha-me'ora'ot veba-'alilot", *Zion* 59 (1994), 205.
- 27 Moshe Rosman, "A Prolegomenon to the Study of Jewish Cultural History", *JSIJ* 1 (2002), 118.
- 28 See Gans' second presidential address to the Verein für Cultur und Wissenschaft der Juden from 28 April 1822 in S. Rubaschoff, "Erstlinge der Entjudung: Drei Reden von Eduard Gans in 'Kulturverein,'" *Der juedische Wille* 2 (1919), translated in Paul Mendes-Flohr and Jehuda Reinharz, eds. *The Jew in the Modern World* (New York, 1995), 217.
- 29 See David N. Myers, *Resisting History: Historicism and its Discontents in German-Jewish Thought* (Princeton, 2003).

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